POLITICS
by
Aristotle
Translated
by Benjamin Jowett
BOOK ONE I
EVERY STATE
is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to
some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think
good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political
community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims
at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.
Some people
think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are
the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their
subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the
manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if
there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The
distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows:
When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the
rules of the political science, the citizens rule and
are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all
this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any
one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided
us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should
always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We
must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order
that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another,
and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
II
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a
state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a
union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female,
that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate
purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind
have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of
natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can
foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master,
and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject,
and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now
nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not
niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian
knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every
instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no
natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female.
Wherefore the poets say,
It is meet that Hellenes should rule over
barbarians;
as if
they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of
these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first
thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right
when he says,
First house and wife and an ox for the
plough, for the
ox is the poor man's slave.
The family
is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday
wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas
'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the
Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and
the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the
first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the
village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the
children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.'
And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings;
because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the
barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the
colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they
were of the same blood. As Homer says:
Each one gives law to his children and to
his wives.
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods
have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under
the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their
ways of life to be like their own.
When several
villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly
or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the
bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.
And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state,
for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each
thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a
man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the
best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is
evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a
state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the
Tribeless,
lawless, hearthless one,
whom
Homer denounces – the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be
compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man
is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is
evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only
animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is
but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals
(for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the
intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is
intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the
just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any
sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association
of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further,
the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since
the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we
might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than
that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to
say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but
only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of
nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is
not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.
But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a
state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who
first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he
is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is
equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which
he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have
not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most
full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the
administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the
principle of order in political society.
III
Seeing then
that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must
speak of the management of the household. The parts of household management
correspond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household
consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in
its fewest possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a
family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have
therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be: I
mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction
of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative relation
(this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a household,
the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical
with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the
nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.
Let us
first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and
also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at
present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and
that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the
political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same.
Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman
exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is
therefore unjust.
IV
Property is
a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art
of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all,
unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a
definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the
accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments
are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the
pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for
in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an
instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a
slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and
the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other
instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or
anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus,
or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet,
of their own accord
entered the assembly of the Gods;
if, in
like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a
hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.
Here, however, another distinction must be drawn; the instruments commonly so
called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of
action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is
made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as
production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments
which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not
production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a
possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part
of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a
possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to
him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs
to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by
nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said
to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a
possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the
possessor.
V
But is
there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a
condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of
nature?
There is no
difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact.
For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary,
but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for
subjection, others for rule.
And there
are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better which
is exercised over better subjects – for example, to rule over men is better
than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by
better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said
to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are
made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the
ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living
creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the
universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in
a musical mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore
restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists
of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the
other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things
which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul,
for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or
corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because
they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly
observe in living creatures both a despotical and a
constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical
rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal
rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind
and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas
the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same
holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature
than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for
then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female
inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of
necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then
there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and
animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who
can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better
for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.
For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in
rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a
slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle;
they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame
animals is not very different; for both with their bodies
minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the
bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the
other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political
life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens – that
some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men
differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the
statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class
should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the
body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul?
but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty
of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free,
and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and
right.
VI
But that
those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may
be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There
is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is
a sort of convention – the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to
belong to the victors. But this right many jurists
impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional
measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing
violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and
subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin
of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as
follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the
greatest power of exercising force; and as superior power is only found where
there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the
dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying
justice with goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the
stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no
force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to
rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of
justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in
accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment
they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be
unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a
slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank
would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to
have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call
Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this
language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it
must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same
principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere,
and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when
at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the
one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:
Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods?
What does
this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble
birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and
animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is
what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.
We see then
that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all are
not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in
some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient
and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one
practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which
nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both;
for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the
slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame.
Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are
friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force
the reverse is true.
VII
The
previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a
constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some
affirm, the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects
who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The
rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas
constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not
called a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain
character, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still
there may be a science for the master and science for the slave. The science of
the slave would be such as the man of
VIII
Let us now
inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting wealth, in
accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown to be a part of
property. The first question is whether the art of getting wealth is the same
with the art of managing a household or a part of it, or instrumental to it;
and if the last, whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is
instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is
instrumental to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the
same way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material I
mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is the material of
the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of
household management is not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the
one uses the material which the other provides. For the art which uses
household stores can be no other than the art of household management. There
is, however, a doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household
management or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence
wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property and
riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general,
parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts
of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of animals and men;
they must all have food, and the differences in their food have made
differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others are
solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain them,
accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their
habits are determined for them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain
with greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have
different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them;
and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ
among themselves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference. The
laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without
trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in
search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of
living farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds.
Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or
rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the
pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain a living from the
cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail
among those whose industry springs up of itself, and whose food is not acquired
by exchange and retail trade – there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the
brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of
two employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the
life of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer
with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any way
which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare
livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are
first born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring forth, together
with their offspring, so much food as will last until they are able to supply
themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous
animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a
supply of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk. In like
manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their
sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use
and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and
for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes
nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has
made all animals for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of
war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes
hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men
who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such
a kind is naturally just.
Of the art
of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the
management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must
either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life,
and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are
the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a
good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that
No bound to riches has been fixed for
man.
But there
is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the instruments of
any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined
as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we
see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers
of households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.
IX
There is
another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called
an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and
property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often
identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they
the same. The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by
experience and art.
Let us
begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:
Of
everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as
such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the
improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is
used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange
for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but
this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an
object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange
extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the
circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer
that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it
been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first
community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it
begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family
originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts,
the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which
they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is
still practiced among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the
necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example,
in exchange for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the
wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the
satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange
grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of
one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what
they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came
into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and
hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which
was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for
example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured
simply by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to
save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.
When the
use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of necessary articles
arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail trade; which was at first
probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by
experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made.
Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought
to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and
wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is
assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting
wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined
money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if
the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it
is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who
is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be
wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger,
like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set
before him into gold?
Hence men
seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the
mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural riches and the
natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; in their true form they
are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of
producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be
concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the measure or limit
of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth
getting. As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health,
and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several
ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the
means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art
of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious
kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which
consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited
acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of
view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find
the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth increase their hoard of
coin without limit. The source of the confusion is the near connection between
the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrument is the same,
although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a
use of the same property, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the
one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led
to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the
whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money
without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in
men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as
their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them
should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of
obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend
on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the
second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they
seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able
to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts,
using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of
courage, for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire
confidence; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art;
but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men
turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to
be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must
contribute.
Thus, then,
we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men
want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be
different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a
household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former
kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
X
And we have
found the answer to our original question, Whether the art of getting wealth is
the business of the manager of a household and of the statesman or not their
business? viz., that wealth is presupposed by them. For as political science
does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses them, so too nature
provides them with earth or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stage
begins the duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the things
which nature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but
to use wool, and to know, too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad
and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the
art of getting wealth is a part of the management of a household and the art of
medicine not; for surely the members of a household must have health just as
they must have life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from one
point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to
consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician;
so in one way the art of household management, in another way the subordinate
art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already
said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; for the business
of nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and the food of the
offspring is always what remains over of that from which it is produced.
Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always
natural.
There are
two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household
management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable,
while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural,
and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with
the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not
from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange,
but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth
of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring
resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this is the most
unnatural.
XI
Enough has
been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now proceed to the
practical part. The discussion of such matters is not unworthy of philosophy,
but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal and irksome. The useful
parts of wealth-getting are, first, the knowledge of livestock – which are most
profitable, and where, and how – as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep
or oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return. A man ought to
know which of these pay better than others, and which pay best in particular
places, for some do better in one place and some in another. Secondly,
husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and
of fish, or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. These are the
divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of the
other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important division is
commerce (of which there are three kinds – the provision of a ship, the
conveyance of goods, exposure for sale – these again differing as they are safer
or more profitable), the second is usury, the third, service for hire – of
this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and
bodily labor. There is still a third sort of wealth getting intermediate
between this and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also
concerned with exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit from the
earth, and from things growing from the earth which, although they bear no
fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, the cutting of timber and all
mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many
branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the
several divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration
of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon
them at greater length now.
Those
occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance;
they are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile
in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which
there is the least need of excellence.
Works have
been written upon these subjects by various persons; for example, by Chares the
Parian, and Apollodorus the
Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting,
while others have treated of other branches; any one who cares for such matters
may refer to their writings. It would be well also to collect the scattered
stories of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune;
for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is
the anecdote of Thales the Milesian
and his financial device, which involves a principle of universal application,
but is attributed to him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was
reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was of
no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was
yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year;
so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all the
olive-presses in Chios and Miletus,
which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the
harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let
them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he
showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that
their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a striking
proof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device for getting wealth is of
universal application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an
art often practiced by cities when they are want of money; they make a monopoly
of provisions.
There was a
man of
XII
Of
household management we have seen that there are three parts – one is the rule
of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father,
and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and
children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a
royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be
exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command
than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger
and more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are
ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures
of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one
rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward
forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying
of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the
male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The
rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of
love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And
therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men,' because
he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects,
but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of
elder and younger, of father and son.
XIII
Thus it is
clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of
inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of
property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the
virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any
excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and
ministerial qualities – whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage,
justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial
qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for,
if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand,
since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that
they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children,
whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and
just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or note So in
general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether
they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally
required in both, why should one of them always rule, and the other always be
ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference
between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more
and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and
that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and
unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be
licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident,
therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as
natural subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the
soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is
subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different from that
of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the
irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally,
and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the
kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner
from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child;
although the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in
different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman
has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it
must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should
partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for
the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in
perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and
rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other hand,
require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly,
then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a
woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates
maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman
in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen
if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists
in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only
deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking,
who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes
must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women,
Silence is a woman's glory, but this is not equally the glory of man.
The child
is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself
alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue
of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful
for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much
virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack
of self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true,
virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their
work through the lack of self control? But is there not a great difference in
the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less
closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he
becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate
slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other
artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such
excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership
which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us
to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves
stand even more in need of admonition than children.
So much for
this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their
several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what
is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have
to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For,
inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the
parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of
the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the
constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any
difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for
the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are
women.
Of these
matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time.
Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning.
And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.
BOOK TWO
I
OUR PURPOSE
is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who
are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not
only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed
states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good
and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for
something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost;
we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are
acquainted are faulty.
We will
begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alternatives are conceivable:
The members of a state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in
common, or (3) some things in common and some not. That they should have
nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community,
and must at any rate have a common place – one city will be in one place, and
the citizens are those who share in that one city. But should a well ordered
state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not
others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and
children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the
II
There are
many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which
Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not
established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes
to the state, the scheme, taken literally is impracticable, and how we are to
interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. I am speaking of the premise from
which the argument of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the
state the better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a
degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a state is to
be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes
a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to
be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought
not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the
destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men,
but of different kinds of men; for similars do not
constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance The usefulness of the
latter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality
(for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of
anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation,
when the nation has not its population organized in villages, but lives an
Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed
differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already
remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and
equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot an rule
together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or
in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern;
just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and
the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since
it is better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that while
there should be continuance of the same persons in power where this is
possible, yet where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of
the citizens, and at the same time it is just that an should share in the
government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to
this is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from
official position, be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are
ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner when
they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident
that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and
that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their
destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them.
Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is
clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a
city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is
large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired,
the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.
III
But, even
supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of
unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all men
saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time,'
which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity in a state. For the
word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine'
and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims
may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own
son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all that falls
to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had
their had their wives and children in common; they would say 'all' but not
'each.' In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them,
not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all':
like some other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even in
abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call
the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but
it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity
in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the proposal.
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed
upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common
interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides
other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he
expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants are often less
useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his
sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will
therefore be neglected by all alike. Further, upon this principle, every one
will use the word 'mine' of one who is prospering or the reverse, however small
a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and so's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be
the number of the citizens; and even about this he will not be positive; for it
is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into
existence, it has survived. But which is better – for each to say 'mine' in
this way, making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand
citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense?
For usually the same person is called by one man his own son whom another calls
his own brother or cousin or kinsman – blood relation or connection by marriage
either of himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or
tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to
be a son after Plato's fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and
children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for
children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding
indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers declare such to
be the fact; they say that in part of
IV
Other
evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to
guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary,
quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against
fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no
relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship
is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them
cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the
children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should
permit love and familiarities between father and son or between brother and
brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them love
of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other
reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father
and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.
This
community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to
the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be
bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they
will remain obedient and not rebel. In a word, the result of such a law would
be just the opposite of which good laws ought to have, and the intention of
Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat
itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the
preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything which
Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world
declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commends would be
like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to
grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become
one, in which case one or both would certainly perish. Whereas in a state
having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will
certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father.' As a little sweet wine
mingled with a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this
sort of community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names
will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the
son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two
qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection – that a thing is your own
and that it is your only one-neither can exist in such a state as this.
Again, the
transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of
artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower
rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers
cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the
previously mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will
happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or
who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer
call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and
fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any
crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and
children, let this be our conclusion.
V
Next let us
consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of
the perfect state have their possessions in common or not? This question may be
discussed separately from the enactments about women and children. Even
supposing that the women and children belong to individuals, according to the
custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having
and using possessions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be
appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common
stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be
common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among
individuals for their private use; this is a form of common property which is
said to exist among certain barbarians. Or (3), the soil and the produce may be
alike common.
When the
husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal
with; but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership
will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and
toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those
who labor little and receive or consume much. But indeed there is always a
difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common, but
especially in their having common property. The partnerships of
fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out over
everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So with servants:
we are most able to take offense at those with whom we most we most frequently
come into contact in daily life.
These are
only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property; the
present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would
be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. Property should
be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when
everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and
they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own
business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as
the proverb says, 'will have all things common.' Even now there are traces of
such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered
states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For,
although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the
disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and
horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a
journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country.
It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common;
and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent
disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels
a thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by
nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this,
however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the
miser's love of money; for all, or almost all, men love money and other such
objects in a measure. And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a
kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be
rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by
excessive unification of the state. The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is
visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it is
an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance' sake);
secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all
things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any
liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property.
Such
legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen
to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner
everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard
denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions
for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out
of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very
different cause – the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is
much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though there
are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private
property.
Again, we
ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but
also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead
appears to be quite impracticable. The error of Socrates must be attributed to
the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of
the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at
which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or
at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state,
like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single
foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and
made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a
system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect
to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or
by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting
common meals, whereby the legislator has made property common. Let us remember
that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of years
these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for
almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put
together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great
light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of government
in the actual process of construction; for the legislator could not form a
state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into
associations for common meals, and into phratries and
tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the
guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try
to enforce already.
But,
indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such a
community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not
guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: are the
husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each individual to
have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual or common. If,
like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, what do they differ
from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon
what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the
ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as
their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If,
on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect
of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it not
contain two states in one, each hostile to the other He makes the guardians
into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest
are the real citizens. But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils
which Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them.
He says indeed that, having so good an education, the citizens will not need
many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he
confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners
of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they
are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. And whether community of
wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or
not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of
government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither
is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small importance if the
common life of the guardians is to be maintained.
Again, if
Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will see
to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will do so if the
agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common? Once
more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men and
women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a
household. The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements
of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a
cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited
warriors? But that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is
evident; for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one
time given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he
says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth;
but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmen.'
Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and says that the
legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy
unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect
happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in
the whole, but in neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians
are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The
Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others
quite as great.
VI
The same,
or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the Laws, and
therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein
described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few
questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community of
property, and the constitution of the state. The population is divided into two
classes – one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is
taken a third class of counselors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not
determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the
government, and whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military
service, or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the
education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the
work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with
discussions about the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly
anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had
intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the
other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and
property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be
the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile
occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is
that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors
number 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.
The
discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and
originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected.
We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now
mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, or some other huge
site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their
women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing
an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities.
It is said
that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points – the people
and the country. But neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him,
firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and
not an isolated life. For a state must have such a military force as will be
serviceable against her neighbors, and not merely useful at home. Even if the
life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states,
still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.
There is
another point: Should not the amount of property be defined in some way which
differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so
much property as will enable him to live temperately, which is only a way of
saying 'to live well'; this is too general a conception. Further, a man may
live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man
must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but
liberally; if the two are parted, liberally will combine with luxury;
temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the
only eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot
use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may;
and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. There
is an inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating
the number of the citizens; the population is to remain unlimited, and he
thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages
being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be
the case in existing states. But greater care will be required than now; for
among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always
distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property
were incapable of division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or
many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more necessary
to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by
calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in
married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so
common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is
the parent of revolution and crime. Pheidon the
Corinthian, who was one of the most ardent legislators, thought that the
families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although
originally all the lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the
opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement
will have to be explained hereafter.
There is
another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ
from their subjects; he only says that they should be related as the warp and
the woof, which are made out of different wools. He allows that a man's whole
property may be increased fivefold, but why should not his land also increase
to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted
by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual two
homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live in two houses.
The whole
system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something
in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of
the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which
would suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right, but not if
he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or
ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian,
or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that
the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise
the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy,
monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of
elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are
selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty
to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in
the habits of daily life. In the Laws it is maintained that the best
constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not
constitutions at all, or are the worst of all. But they are nearer the truth
who combine many forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of more
numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of
monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to
oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; for although the
appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected
combines both elements, the way in which the rich are compelled by law to
attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political
duties, while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavor to have the
greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the
highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these
are oligarchical features. The oligarchical
principle prevails also in the choice of the council, for all are compelled to
choose, but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class,
and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but
not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three
classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only
compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says
that there ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a
preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have the larger
incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled will not vote.
These considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes for
examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato's should not be
composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a danger in electing the
magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected; for, if but a small
number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire. Such is
the constitution which is described in the Laws.
VII
Other
constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by
philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing
ones than either of Plato's. No one else has introduced such novelties as the
community of women and children, or public tables for women: other legislators
begin with what is necessary. In the opinion of some, the regulation of
property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all
revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas
of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the
citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new
colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily
when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of
compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive
marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.
Plato in
the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be
allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any citizen to possess more
than five times the minimum qualification But those who make such laws should
remember what they are apt to forget – that the legislator who fixes the amount
of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are
too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation
of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for
men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That the equalization
of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood
even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others
prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there
are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to
sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has
befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the
original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas,
and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers
no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again, where there is equality of
property, the amount may be either too large or too small, and the possessor
may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought
not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their
amount. Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will
be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind
which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient
education is provided by the laws. But Phaleas will
probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion,
there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education.
Still he should tell precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there
ought to be in be in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that
predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles
arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of
honor, though in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the
inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the
poet says,
The bad and good alike in honor share.
There are
crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas
expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away
from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But
want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and
not to be in a state of desire – they wish to cure some desire, going beyond
the necessities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only
reason – they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures
unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes.
Now what is
the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation;
of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures
which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires
nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others.
The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity.
Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence
great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills
a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas
avail only against petty crimes.
There is
another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal
welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to
neighboring nations, and to all who are outside of it. The government must be
organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word.
And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the
internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The
property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbors may
be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so
small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal
power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not
laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an
advantage. The best limit will probably be, that a more powerful neighbor must
have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your
wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is
a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates
was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider
how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be
incurred in the time. 'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that
to leave Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates,
and he desisted from the siege.
The
equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens
from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this direction is very great. For the
nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more than
an equal share of honors; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and
revolution. And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become
customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature
of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of
it. The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the
nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from
getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated.
Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is
imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also in
slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his
movables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be
imposed on them, or they must an be let alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, if, as he
supposes, all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a
supplementary part of the body of citizens. But if there is a law that artisans
are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works,
as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced.
From these
observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was
wrong or right in his ideas.
VIII
Hippodamus,
the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus,
the same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the
Piraeus – a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general
eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected (for he would wear
flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but these were worn on a cheap but warm
garment both in winter and summer); he, besides aspiring to be an adept in the
knowledge of nature, was the first person not a statesman who made inquiries
about the best form of government.
The city of
The first
of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of
the citizens. The artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a
share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans
neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior
class. That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for
generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal
magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the
two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens?
It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the
other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous;
and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at all,
or have power to appoint magistrates? Further, what use are farmers to the
city? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can
live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too, if they really
provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government.
But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed
to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit.
Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they
are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical
with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction
between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from
the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will
make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything.
Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands, and those of the
public as well, they will have difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce
which will maintain two households: and why, in this case, should there be any
division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the
same land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.
Neither is the law to commended which says that the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decis