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Are You Listening?

By Dr. J. Howard Baker

Last Saturday [February 1, 2003], as I was working on my computer here in East Texas, I heard a very powerful rumbling sound that shook our house. It was thirty minutes later that I discovered it was the Columbia breaking apart overhead. As soon as I learned the tragic news my thoughts flashed back to the first shuttle disaster and I wondered if not listening to warning had brought about this disaster as well.

Although the investigation will be ongoing for some time, already we are learning that voices of concern had been raised about the safety of the shuttle program in general, and the Columbia in particular, for a number of years. Whether the disaster was caused by neglect, or some unpreventable occurrence, such as the shuttle being struck by “space junk” or a meteor, is yet to be determined.

Nevertheless, ABC News has reported this week that last year NASA's own safety board strongly criticized the agency for putting off recommended safety upgrades on the shuttle. Already a member of the presidential commission that investigated the Challenger disaster 17 years ago has told ABC News that NASA managers handling the doomed Columbia flight were "professionally irresponsible" in dealing with damage reports early in the mission.

Challenger, the second orbiter to become operational at Kennedy Space Center, was named after the British Naval research vessel HMS Challenger that sailed the Atlantic and Pacific oceans during the 1870's. The shuttle Challenger was actually the second NASA craft to bear this name. The Apollo 17 lunar module also carried the name of Challenger.

As early as 1981, concerns about rubber seal problems had been expressed by Morton Thiokol engineers. Morton Thiokol was the manufacturer of the solid rocket boosters used with the shuttle. By the seventh flight of Challenger, Flight 51-B on April 29, 1985, there was growing evidence that there were serious problems with various seals, including the now infamous O-rings, the two rubber rings sealing the segments of the boosters.

A post flight inspection occurred in June 1985, at Morton Thiokol in Utah. A nozzle joint from Flight 51B was found to have a primary seal eroded in three places, and the secondary seal in the same joint was also eroded. It was postulated that this primary seal had never sealed during the full two minutes of flight. At this point concerns escalated because, if this same scenario happened in a field joint, the secondary seal could also be compromised—especially during a low temperature launch.

On July 31, 1985, an interoffice memo was written to the Vice President of engineering at Morton Thiokol making sure that management was fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. It stated that if this problem was ignored the result would be “a catastrophe of the highest order—loss of human life.”

On the evening of January 27, 1986, Morton Thiokol was providing information to NASA regarding concerns for the next day's planned launch of Challenger Flight STS 51-L, currently resting on launch pad 39-B at the Cape. Thiokol engineers were very concerned that the abnormally cold temperatures would affect the "O" rings to nonperformance standards. The mission had already been canceled due to weather, and, as far as NASA was concerned, another cancellation due to weather was unthinkable.

The overnight temperature was predicted to reach 18 degrees Fahrenheit. The engineers recommended that the launch not take place below 51 degrees. Unfortunately, the decision to launch became a “management decision.” The engineers were excluded from the final decision. NASA promptly accepted the recommendation of management to launch without any probing discussion. They now had received the message they wanted to hear. Management “grandiosity” and the politics of the situation had overridden engineering. The overriding goal was to “stay on schedule.” After all, the shuttles had flown successfully in all past missions!

Just like Columbia, the Challenger lifted off from the Kennedy Space Center with a crew of seven, including the first schoolteacher to be an astronaut, Christa McAuliffe (pronounced muh KAW lihf). Christa had been selected from more than 11,000 teachers who had applied! Many of us can still remember where we were when we watched the launch.

All over the country, millions of us watched that awful bloom spread across our television screens and realized that something had gone terribly wrong before we heard the voice of Mission Control say: "Obviously ... a major malfunction."

The families of the crew were hustled off the roof, down elevators, and into buses. They were taken to the crew’s quarters where they waited for news. Christa’s husband, Steve McAuliffe, with Scott, nine, and Caroline, six, said, "This is not how it's supposed to be."

These seven brave astronauts became the first U.S. space crew to die in flight when Challenger exploded just 73 seconds after lift-off. The Challenger shuttle itself was not actually destroyed in the explosion. This is a well-documented fact. What looked like an explosion was fuel burning after the external tank came apart. The medical/forensic report confirmed that at least some of the crew was not only alive, but also conscious after the orbiter broke up. The forces of the breakup were not violent enough for a lethal injury, and the crew had turned some of the emergency-escape air packs on manually. However, they probably all passed out within the first minute of the three-minute fall into the ocean. The 200-MPH water impact was most certainly violent enough to kill them all.

Last week the crew of the Columbia also certainly knew something had gone terribly wrong prior to their deaths. NASA admits that the crew, prior to loss of communication, had acknowledged a warning on the display panel.

Shortly after the last funerals were held following the Challenger disaster, a commission chaired by former Secretary of State William Rogers revealed the conclusions of its investigation. The explosion of the $1.2 billion spacecraft was due to a faulty O-ring seal on the solid rocket fuel booster, a $900 synthetic rubber band that engineers had warned was vulnerable at temperatures below 51 degrees. The Challenger launch, canceled three times, had finally taken place in 36-degree weather. The Rogers Commission found both the company that made the O-rings, Morton Thiokol, and NASA itself guilty of allowing an avoidable accident to occur. The 256-page report described a failure in management, which even today is used as a model in business schools of

how not to listen and make a decision.

Thiokol engineers had argued against the launch, but the top Thiokol managers had issued a reversal and made a decision to proceed. The final decision was a management decision, not an engineering decision. The real flaw was the inability of NASA and Thiokol management to receive and properly deal with negative information from the bottom.

Benjamin Franklin once said: “To be humble to superiors is a duty, to equals courtesy, to inferiors nobleness.”

Here are some important points that should be learned by each of us from the Challenger disaster:

1. Knowing something, or having expertise, does not mean one will be heard in an organization.

2. Bureaucratic organizational structure can impair communication.

3. Expertise and knowledge does not always reside at the top of an organization.

4. Often management does not want to hear bad news.

5. Honest communication is not necessarily effective without proper organizational structure and culture.

6. Bad news does not travel easily in hierarchical structures.

7. Just because a decision process that ignores bad news from below has worked in the past does not mean the decision process is not flawed.

Avoiding bad news, and ignoring input from others with which we disagree, is not unique to NASA or Morton Thiokol. It is a characteristic of our human nature. Throughout history there has always been a human tendency to “shoot the messenger” that brings a message we don’t want to hear.

What are some typical human responses to negative messages?

1. Physically demonstrate disapproval by getting up and leaving. This is a response of those who are reactive and have not learned that “seeking to understand” does not mean you have to agree with what is being said.

2. Attack the messenger. If you can’t attack the message, discredit it by finding fault with the one delivering the message. Attack his style, or even his looks. Ask, “Who does he think he is?” Picking the messenger apart is a common reaction to an undesired message.

3. Refuse to truly listen–that is, to heed what is being said. This usually involves pretend listening. We listen, but with no intent to change.

4. Diverting attention to others, rather than facing the message being delivered to you.

5. Misinterpreting, or hearing a different message, so you never have to face the real message. Our minds are capable of hearing and seeing things in a way that allows us to argue and resist “a message”–even though it is not the “real message.” In effect, we are arguing against a message that was never delivered. We create a “straw man” opponent, which is more easily defeated. We are careless in our hearing because it serves our purpose of ignoring the true message. Humans tend to hear what they want to hear, or expect to hear, rather than what is actually said. Oh, how easy it is for our minds to filter a word or two, such as “if” or “may”, and receive a totally different message!

Ignoring a problem or negative message is a typical intentional strategy used by executives in many large organizations. Whether in NASA or ENRON, managers often just continue “business as usual,” pretending that the negative message was never delivered. This is certainly a short-term strategy. However, often the “short term” will be long enough for them to retire and let the next poor soul deal with the ultimate consequences of their failure to act.

However, if this strategy will not work, or fit the time frame of management’s anticipated departure, another strategy is often employed. This strategy is to bring up other negative issues or bad news–usually relatively minor issues, or problems that are already in the process of being solved–as a distraction from the more serious issue or problem at hand. This accomplishes two things:

First, it creates the appearance that management is on the ball, and is actively involved in problem solving, while they continue to avoid the really critical strategic issue or problem. They attempt to create the illusion of decisiveness by being decisive with the problems they select, whereas they hide their real indecisiveness regarding the issue or problem brought to them that they want to avoid—often with tragic long-term consequences!

Second, presenting oneself as actively engaged in “solving problems” is a compliance-gaining strategy. That is, you don’t tend to question a fire fighter in the midst of fighting a fire. Cunning management understands that we tend to wait until a crisis is over before we question performance. Therefore, the creation of a constant series of minor problems makes perfect strategic sense to maintain compliance and control over others and avoid the really serious issues and problems.

Bringing warning messages—like the engineers did at Morton Thiokol—is not popular. Often these messages go unheeded.

What warning messages have you received recently? Are you listening and heeding, or are you ignoring them? Are you using one of the tactics I have described to avoid facing them and changing?

Just as seeing warning signs along the highway is a natural part of driving a vehicle, receiving warnings is a natural part of a leader’s job. Can you imagine driving without warnings along the highway such as “Stop Ahead”, “Dangerous Curve”, and “Railroad Crossing?” Driving would be considerably more dangerous without such warnings.

The same is true of in our personal and professional lives. However, just like the management at NASA and Morton Thiokol, our tendency is to avoid or ignore negative messages. We tend to close our ears, harden our hearts, and avoid bad news. Our natural tendency is to want to hear what we WANT to hear.

Part of learning to listen involves learning how to properly receive negative messages and warnings without engaging in the avoidance tactics. Learning to be a good listener is a very important part of being a good leader.

Unfortunately, most people view warnings as negative and undesirable messages. But honest negative messages are a necessary part of our life just as course corrections are a necessary part of flying. It is said that a plane is “off course” during about 90% of a flight. However, the pilot or automatic pilot is constantly making course corrections to bring the plane back on course. As a result the plane reaches its destination even though it was off course for most of the flight! In order to be effective leaders, we need “course corrections” from others from time to time.

A loving parent will give a child “course corrections” when necessary. It is the responsibility of the parent to warn and to bring negative messages and correction to children when necessary.

A proverb in the book of Proverbs says:

A wise son heeds his father’s instruction,

But a scoffer does not listen to rebuke.

The habit of rejecting negative messages can start very early in life. We can be scripted in the habit of not receiving negative messages, warnings, and rebuke. This behavior can become so natural to us that we are not even aware of it as we grow older.

Wise persons will seek out good friends and ask them how well they receive warnings, negative messages and rebuke. Close friends admonish and encourage one another, and if necessary, warn and rebuke one another. Close friends can often see problems and help us see our hidden faults.

Are you willing to hear a negative message from such a friend, or do you immediately respond to such feedback with defense mechanisms and cut off the communication? We must understand that negative messages and warnings are critical to our success as leaders.

If you don’t have such a close relationship with anyone, get busy immediately and begin to build such closeness! Without it you are vulnerable.

When you do give input, feedback, or a warning to one you are close to, make sure your motive is right. All that you do must be done in humility and an attitude of service. Many leaders experience personal “Challenger-like” disasters in their lives as a result of not being close to others and not being humble and teachable.

Some leaders stay aloof and don’t want to get “too close” to others, thinking that will protect them from possible hurt or betrayal. That is a dangerous mindset, and is one that springs from immaturity and self-interest!

There is a saying, “A man watches himself best when others watch him, too.”

We must not be like the bureaucrats at Morton Thiokol and NASA that ignored negative messages and placed meeting their own schedules ahead of precious human life! Whether we are the giver of a warning or the receiver of one, let us remember the lesson of Challenger!

Comments to: hbaker@leadingtoday.org

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About the author:

Dr. J. Howard Baker is Assistant Professor of Computer Information Systems at the University of Louisiana at Monroe. Dr. Baker has been a Franklin Covey 7 Habits of Highly Effective People certified facilitator since 1994, and has served the University of Texas at Tyler as their facilitator since 1997. During the summer he offers a graduate and undergraduate course at U. T. Tyler in personal and organizational leadership. He holds a B.S. in Management from Samford University, a Master of Accounting (MAcc) from the University of Southern California, and a Ph.D. in Information Systems from the University of Texas at Arlington. Dr. Baker is Editor of the E-Journal of Organizational Learning and Leadership which can be found at the weLEAD In Learning Online web site.